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REVOLT OF THE MASSES: ARMED CIVILIANS
AND THE INSURRECTIONARY THEORY OF
THE SECOND AMENDMENT
COLONEL CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., USAF*
"A little rebellion now and then is a good thing."
-Thomas Jefferson-
"There is a feeling out there that if the government goes too far,
there is going to be shooting someday."
-Civilian militia leader, Catron County, NM, October 1994***
"If you say violence is an acceptable way to make change, you are
wrong.
-President William Clinton, May 1995'...
I. INTRODUCTION
With as many as 100,000 people in forty-five states organizing them-
selves into self-styled militias much like the Catron County group,' the
* Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Strategic Command. B.A. 1972, St. Joseph's University;
J.D. 1975, Villanova University; Distinguished Graduate, 1992, National War College. The
views and opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author alone and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense or any of its components.
** As quoted in DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS 265 (Robert
Debs Heinl, Jr. ed., 1966).
*** Quoting Hugh McKeen, a county commissioner in Catron County, New Mexico,
an area reported to be "a bastion of anti-Washington sentiment and where residents are
organizing their own armed militia." See George de Lama, For Militias, Invaders of US.
Are Everywhere, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 1994, at 1.
**** Excerpts From Clinton's Commencement Speech, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1995, at
9 (Clinton delivered the commencement address at Michigan State University on May 5,
1995, in which he condemned the preaching of civilian militias who "dare ... suggest that
we in the freest nation on earth live in tyranny."
1. Id. Note, however, that statistics on militia membership vary widely. For
example, the Christian Science Monitor places the number of members at about 10,000
nationwide. See Sam Walker, "Militias " Forming Across US To Protest Gun Control Laws,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1. Some militias claim as many as eight
million adherents, though membership is reported to be waning following the bombing of the
Oklahoma City Federal building. See Mark Potok, Militias Find Bombing Has Repercus-
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troubling specter of armed defiance of government emerges. Indeed, with
the main suspect in the April 19, 1995 bombing of the Federal building in
Oklahoma City reportedly linked to "extremist" civilian militias, the groups
"suddenly are no longer seen as largely harmless, weekend warriors donned112
in camouflage and battle fatigues. Reportedly, these groups are "linked
in a fervent fear, if not paranoia, about what they see as Uncle Sam's
encroachment on their property rights and right to bear arms."3 They insist
that the Second Amendment4 gives them the constitutional right to bear
arms "to battle the American government, if necessary. ' One militia leader
maintains that "[t]here are three methods to effect change . . . '[t]he jury
box, the ballot box, and the cartridge box. No one in a right-thinking mind
would choose the last one, but we must be prepared for all contingencies." 6
Such beliefs highlight what is perhaps the most intriguing argument
supporting the right to bear arms, what might be called the "insurrection-
ary"7 theory of the Second Amendment. Simply stated, the proposition
sions, USA TODAY, April 28-30, 1995, at IA-2A.
2. Tom Kenworthy & George Lardner Jr., The Militias: Guns and Bitter, WASH.
POST, May 4, 1995, at A23.
3. de Lama, supra note ***, at 1. Militia members have a variety of beliefs
including the fear that the United States is drifting toward world government. See Mike
Tharp, The Rise of Citizen Militias, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 1994, at 34; see
also Jill Smolowe, Enemies of the State, TIME, May 8, 1995, at 62-63 (describing various
militias and their beliefs). Many militias find common cause in that they are "laying the
groundwork for massive resistance to the federal government and its law enforcement
authorities." See Kenworthy & Lardner, supra note 2, at A23 (citing survey conducted by
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith). According to some militia advocates, the "first
and foremost reason for a militia is to collectively exercise a fundamental right: to keep and
bear arms." See Carl D. Haggard & Nancy E. Haggard, A Well-Regulated and Legal Militia,
SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, May 1995, at 46, 47. A controversy erupted when several of these
groups learned that Marines at Twentynine Palms Marine Corp Air-Ground Combat Center
were asked on a survey if they would fire upon "U.S. Citizens who refuse or resist
confiscation of firearms banned by the U.S. government." The question turned out to be
merely part of a graduate student's project aimed a studying unit cohesion and whether
Marines understood the difference between lawful and unlawful orders. See Margaret Roth,
Harmless Question or a Plan for Tyranny, AIR FORCE TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at 25.
4. The Second Amendment states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
5. Tharp, supra note 3, at 34-35. See also infra note 50 and accompanying text
(discussing judicial holdings that membership in unorganized, sedentary, or nongovernmental
militias does not provide Second Amendment protection).
6. David Knight of the self-styled "Michigan Militia" as quoted by Walker, supra
note 1, at 14.
7. There are technical distinctions between insurrections, rebellions, and civil wars.
See 45 AM. JUR. 2D Insurrection § 1 (1969). An "insurrection" is defined as a "rising against
civil or political authority, but as something more than a mob or riot." A "rebellion" is a
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holds that the possession of firearms by individuals serves as the ultimate
check on the power of government. The concept postulates that the Second
Amendment was intended to provide the means by which the people, as a
last resort, could rise in armed revolt against tyrannical authorities. A
critical corollary to the theory is the premise that masses of armed civilians
could subdue any professional standing army that might support a despotic
regime, or itself seize power.'
This Article will briefly examine the source of the theory, the effect of
various historical facts upon it, and its continuing viability in both a
practical and abstract sense. In short, this piece will attempt to determine
to what extent the Second Amendment still represents a legally valid and
militarily sound means to resist tyranny.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Revolutionary Heritage
In Scales v. United States,9 Justice William 0. Douglas remarked in his
dissent that "[b]elief in the principle of revolution is deep in our tradi-
tions."' The "right of revolution," Justice Douglas explained, "is a part
of the fabric of our institutions."'' As Justice Douglas suggested, the
belief traces its origin to the nation's beginnings. Colonial Americans,
steeped in the social contract theories of John Locke,' 2 asserted in the
conflict which is "void of all appearance of justice." A "civil war" is an armed clash which
achieves the status of lawful armed conflict within the meaning of international law. Id. For
the purposes of this Article those terms, together with "uprising," "resistance movement,"
"insurgency," and related expressions are used interchangeably unless otherwise stated.
The use of the word "insurrectionary" title of this Article was partly inspired by Dennis
Henigan. See Dennis Henigan, Arms, Anarchy, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. L. REV.
107 (1991). Ironically, Henigan found it "startling" that anyone should assert a "generalized
constitutional right of all citizens to engage in armed insurrection against their government.
This 'insurrectionist theory' of the Second Amendment, in the judgment of this writer,
represents a profoundly dangerous doctrine of unrestrained individual rights which, if adopted
by the courts, would threaten the rule of law itself." Id. at 110.
8. 1 have written an article that uses a fictional military coup as a means to discuss
current military affairs issues. See Charles J. Dunlap Jr., The Origins of the American
Military Coup of 2012, PARAMETERS, Winter 1992-93, at 1.
9. 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (upholding a Smith Act conviction for active membership
in the Communist party).
10. Id. at 268.
11. Id. at 269.
12. A "social contract" is the political theory that contends that an unwritten
agreement with reciprocal obligations exists between the members of a society and the State.
John Locke argued that "moral principles and obligations existed before the creation of the
State, so that men could change the State if it failed to uphold these principles .... " THE
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Declaration of Independence a right to change government. In that
document Americans forthrightly proclaimed the Lockean philosophy that
governments were formed to secure "certain unalienable rights" and that
"whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government." 3
B. The Problem of Standing Armies
The Framers knew that exercising the right to alter or abolish an oppres-
sive government is no easy task when such authorities can call upon a full-
time standing army for protection. Colonial Americans had a deep distrust
of professional militaries)4 Their English heritage, and especially their
awareness of the excesses of Cromwell's New Model Army, 5 taught them
that standing armies could be tools of a tyrannical monarch or a rogue
military commander.' 6 Their apprehension gained a solid a posteriori basis
HARPER DICTIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT 578 (Alan Bullock & Oliver Stallybrass eds.,
1977). See also John Locke, Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay, in 35 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 23, 73-81 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (discussing
the social contract that exists between citizens and the State); MASTERPIECES OF WORLD
PHILOSOPHY 269 (Frank N. Magill ed., 1990) (discussing the impact of Locke's philosophy
on the Declaration of Independence); Burton M. Leiser, John Locke, in GREAT THINKERS OF
THE WESTERN WORLD 223-27 (Ian P. McGreal ed., 1992) (arguing that "Locke's doctrine
had an enormous influence on the founding fathers of the United States of America and
contributed significantly to both the American and the French Revolutions").
13. IX THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Ironically, exciting
domestic insurrections is one of the abuses by the British Monarch that document
enumerates. See infra note 18.
14. See RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE
CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, 3-9 (1975)
[hereinafter KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD].
15. See generally William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the
Constitution: A Legal History, 136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1992); see also Caleb Carr, The
Troubled Genius of Oliver Cromwell, MIL. HIST. Q., Summer 1990, at 82 (arguing that
Cromwell's military genius is underrated).
16. One colonial era commentator observed that the threat of a standing army
extended beyond mere manipulation by a despotic civilian government:
The liberties of a people are in danger from a large standing army, not only because the
rulers may employ them for the purposes of supporting themselves in any usurpations
of power, which they may see proper to exercise, but there is great hazard, that an army
will subvert the forms of the government, under whose authority, they are raised, and
establish one, according to the pleasure of their leaders.
"Brutus" X, That Dangerous Engine of Despotism, A Standing Army, N.Y.J., Jan. 24, 1788,
reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 86 (Library of America ed., 1993).
[Vol. 62:643
INSURRECTIONARY THEORY
when British regulars were used to quell the spreading dissatisfaction with
colonial rule.
17
The Framers had other, very practical reasons for shunning standing
armies, not the least of which was their enormous expense. Indeed,
Britain's clumsy efforts at taxing the colonists to defray the cost of troops
stationed in America helped instigate the Revolution. As one historian
observed: "The American Revolution, like so many rebellions and insurrec-
tions throughout modem history, originated as a revolt against taxes levied
to support an army."' 8 America's own troops were scarcely less a burden.
During the Revolution the continual struggle to find money for the military
strained the fledgling Continental Congress. 9
Another key reason for opposing standing armies was a European-based
societal contempt for the kind of person who served in eighteenth century
militaries. Soldiering was a horrifying affair of close-range collisions of
musket fire and human flesh. Brutal discipline was needed to steel men for
this terrifying experience.2° Not surprisingly, armies filled their ranks with
society's outcasts; only the most desperate tolerated the cruel conditions.2'
It was obvious to the early Americans that a force so composed was
vulnerable to nefarious exploitation by the leaders upon whom its existence
depended. Quartering such soldiers in colonists' homes became yet another
catalyst for the Revolution.22
17. See generally Fields & Hardy, supra note 15, at 25-26.
18. BRUCE D. PORTER, WAR AND THE RISE OF THE STATE 249 (1994) (citation
omitted).
19. See John Shy, Logistical Crisis and the American Revolution: A Hypothesis, in
FEEDING MARS: LOGISTICS IN WESTERN WARFARE FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE
PRESENT 161 (John A. Lynn ed., 1993) (arguing that the logistical dilemmas of the
Revolution were an important influence on the Constitution). By the end of the Revolution,
over $10,000,000 in pay and pensions was owed veterans. See PORTER, supra note 18, at
253.
20. Because muskets were inaccurate except at relatively close range, soldiers were
often obliged to advance shoulder-to-shoulder to within a few dozen yards of their enemy.
Along with the savage fusillades of musketry that followed, the ranks would also be ripped
by withering cannonade. Primitive or non-existent medical care resigned those not killed
outright to an agonizing death. See generally KoHN, EAGLE AND SWORD, supra note 14, at
2.
21. Military historian John Keegan reported:
[N]o pre-1789 society considered soldiering a calling for any but the few. War was
rightly seen as too brutal a business for any except those bred to it by social position
or driven to enlist by lack of any social position whatsoever; mercenaries and regulars
alike, poor, jobless, often criminally outcast, were judged fitted for war because peaceful
life offered them nothing but equivalent hardship.
JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 364 (1993).
22. See David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of
Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1971). See also PORTER,
supra note 18, at 250 (noting that the "mere phrase ['standing army'] was an anathema
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C. The Debate on the Constitution
When the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation necessitated the
drafting of the Constitution,23 limiting the role of a standing army was a
dominant aim.24 Some sought to obviate its despotic potential by eliminat-
ing it altogether and relying solely on state militias for the nation's defense.
Others doubted the military wisdom of that strategy and insisted on a
modest full-time army. James Madison and the Federalists argued that
the oppressive potential of a small standing army could be offset by vast
state militias numbering as many as 500,000 armed citizens. 26  The
Supreme Court in Perpich v. Department of Defense27 explained the
controversy and the compromise that resulted:
On the one hand, there was a widespread fear that a national standing
Army posed an intolerable threat to individual liberty and to the sover-
eignty of the separate States, while, on the other hand, there was a
recognition of the danger of relying on inadequately trained soldiers as the
primary means of providing for the common defense. Thus, Congress was
authorized both to raise and support a national Army and also to organize
"the Militia." 28
Nevertheless, to the Anti-Federalists a constitution that concentrated
authority in a central government featuring a standing army of any size was
unacceptable. They believed that the federal government was so militarily
powerful 29 that individual rights needed explicit protection. Noah
Webster's claim that "[b]efore a standing army can rule, the people must be
conjuring up images of continental despotism, of British redcoats quartered in civilian
homes.").
23. See PORTER, supra note 18, at 253 (arguing that the inadequacy of the Articles
of Confederation related mainly to its deficiencies concerning national security).
24. See generally Richard H. Kohn, The Constitution and National Security: The
Intent of the Framers, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 1789-1989 61 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991) [hereinafter Kohn, The
Constitution and National Security].
25. See generally Fields & Hardy, supra note 15, at 31-32 (discussing concerns about
the militia's capability viz-a-viz the military threats).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 321 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
27. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
28. Id. at 340.
29. For example, the Constitution forbade states to maintain military forces and gave
Congress sole authority to "raise and support [a]rmies," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12,
provide for a navy, id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 13, and make rules for both. Id. at cl. 14. Congress
also had extensive authority over the militia, being able to call it forth to execute laws,
"suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." Id. at cl. 15. Congress also controls
"organizing, arming, and disciplining" the militia, as well as governing any part of it while
in federal service. Id. at cl. 16.
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disarmed"3 seemed hollow absent a specific guarantee that the people
would not, in fact, be disarmed.
The linchpin of the scheme to counterbalance the potentially dangerous
standing army was an armed citizenry, a force Webster considered superior
to any body of regular troops that could be raised in the United States.31
But how could the Anti-Federalists be assured that the people would have
the means to check the power of the standing army? The addition of the
Bill of Rights was meant to redress that perceived asymmetry and others.
Among the solutions the Framers devised to ensure that state-based militias
remained effective and free from federal encroachment was the Second
Amendment.32 In this amendment, both the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists sought to assure formally that the states would retain sufficient
military potential to defeat, if necessary, the forces of an overreaching
central government.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. The Purpose of the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment's "obvious purpose," the Supreme Court de-
clared in United States v. Miller, was "to assure the continuation and render
possible the effectiveness of ... [militia] forces."33 Miller established the
Court's unequivocal conclusion that the underlying purpose of the Second
Amendment is martial in nature34-a significant obstacle to those who
30. Fields & Hardy, supra note 15, at 35 (quoting Noah Webster, AN EXAMINATION
INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE
CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA 43 (1787)).
31. Id.
32. Historian Richard H. Kohn explained:
[P]recisely because the militia served as a powerful check against an arbitrary and
tyrannical national government, opponents of the Constitution worried that the new
government's influence over the state forces would lead to their neglect, or worse yet,
a concerted effort to enfeeble them in order to render the states impotent. That is the
primary reason why opponents of the Constitution insisted, in ratifying conventions and
afterwards, on amendments to guarantee the right of citizens to bear arms. The final
check on standing armies, in the minds both of the framers of the Constitution and
opponents of the new system, was civil war.
Kohn, The Constitution and National Security, supra note 24, at 85. See also DAVE R.
PALMER, 1794: AMERICA, ITS ARMY, AND THE BIRTH OF THE NATION 134, 141 (1994)
(arguing that the Second Amendment "sought to alleviate the widespread concern that
Congress in its zeal to regulate the militia might emasculate it. The ability of a state to
maintain a strong militia was secured by this vested right to bear arms.").
33. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
34. This view comports with Kohn's analysis of the purpose of the Second
Amendment. See Kohn, The Constitution and National Security, supra note 24, at 85.
1995]'
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
argue that the Second Amendment was intended to serve crime control and
sporting purposes.35 Miller did not, however, detail exactly how the
Second Amendment intended to "render possible" the effectiveness of the
militia, and this uncertainty continues to generate debate.
The controversy is largely over whether the Framers meant the right to
bear arms to apply exclusively to organized state militias tasked with
resisting possible federal tyranny (the collectivist theory) or whether they
wanted it to apply to the people in an individual sense (the individual rights
theory).36 Proponents of the collectivist theory cite the Amendment's
prefatory phrase discussing a "well regulated militia" as evidence that the
right to bear arms exists only in that context. Individual-rights advocates
argue vociferously that the Amendment's subsequent phrase regarding the
"right of the people" clearly supports their theory.37
The debate is complicated by the remarkable dearth of Supreme Court
jurisprudence related to the Second Amendment.38 Filling the vacuum are
35. The Framers understood the value of firearms for hunting and for a posse
comitatus and for personal protection against crime. For example, the minority of the
Pennsylvania state convention that voted to adopt the Constitution offered a proposal for an
amendment that explicitly cited "the defence of themselves" and the "purpose of killing
game" as supporting a right to bear arms. See Robert Dowlut, Federal and State
Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 62-63 (1989) (citing EDWARD
DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 32, 50-56 (1957) and
quoting PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788 422 (1888)).
Nevertheless, although beyond the scope of this Article, the evidence supporting the idea that
the specific purpose of the Second Amendment was also to guarantee the right to bear arms
for hunting and crime control purposes is unpersuasive. But cf Nelson Lund, The Second
Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Setf-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 117-
21 (1987). The main purpose of including the right to bear arms in the Constitution "was
to preserve a substantial degree of military power in the citizenry at large, so as to prevent
tyranny-not to protect hunters." See Glenn H. Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Under the Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 647, 665 (1994) (contending that the Tennessee Constitution had a similar main
purpose). It is of course true, as Professor Kates points out, that "where the right specified
is to have a gun for one purpose, however, one who lawfully has it for that purpose may
properly use it for such other purposes as hunting or the defense of his life or another's."
Don B. Kates Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,
82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 245 (1983).
36. For a brief discussion of the individual rights/collective rights debate in the
context of Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983), see ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE: THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN ACTION 93-103 (1991). For a listing of four post-1980 law review articles
supporting the collectivist interpretation and thirty-four articles supporting the individual
rights view, see WAYNE LAPIERRE, GUNS, CRIME, AND FREEDOM 237-40 (1994).
37. See generally LAPIERRE, supra note 36.
38. Besides Miller, no other twentieth century case substantively discusses the Second
Amendment. For recent discussions of the Supreme Court's reluctance to address the Second
650 [Vol. 62:643
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volumes of analysis of the Framers' original intent. Although only one of
several means of constitutional inquiry,39 it has come to dominate Second
Amendment discussion. But original intent analysis, problematic under
the best of circumstances," is further hampered by the relatively paucity
of historical documentation42 directly related to the Framers' intent regard-
ing the Second Amendment.
No Federal court this century has endorsed the individual rights view.
When Second Amendment issues arise courts ordinarily support the
collectivist theory.43 Noting that the Supreme Court has never held that the
Second Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth and made applicable
to the states, 44 many courts have concluded that the Second Amendment
only prohibits the federal government from infringing upon the states' right
to arm and train militias.45 Some courts, like the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Hale,4 6 have found it unnecessary to resolve the collectivist versus
individual rights conundrum by finding that the appropriate inquiry was
whether or not an individual's possession of a firearm was related to the
preservation or efficiency of a militia.47
Still, synergies exist between the collectivist and individual rights views.
The collectivists are correct in asserting that the fundamental purpose of the
Amendment see, e.g., William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and The Personal Right
to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1239 n.10 (1994); Michael J. Quinlan, Is There a Neutral
Justification for Refising to hnplement the Second Amendment or Is the Supreme Court Just
"Gun Shy"?, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 641 (1993). What makes the absence of Supreme Court
jurisprudence particularly surprising is that military affairs are such a central feature of
United States history. See generally GEOFFREY PERRET, A COUNTRY MADE BY WAR (1989)
(exploring the sociological impact of military conflict on American life).
39. For a brief discussion of the various approaches to constitutional interpretation,
see generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
THE SUPREME COURT 183 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 643 (1989) (citing PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE (1982)).
40. See. e.g., Kates, supra note 35.
41. See, e.g., Kohn, The Constitution and National Security, supra note 24, at 61-63.
42. In part this may be the result of the Framers' penchant for secrecy. See Gregory
D. Foster, The Intellectual Legacy of Our Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 22-23 (Howard E. Shuman & Walter R. Thomas eds., 1990) (discussing
Washington's efforts to keep the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention secret).
43. See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 36, at 100.
44. See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
265 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
45. See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 36, at 100; Robert J. Cottrol, The
Second Amendment, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 763 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 1992); Quinlan, supra note 38, at 663-76 (all discussing the incorporation issue).
46. 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993).
47. Id. at 1020.
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Second Amendment is to support the well regulated militias of the States.48
However, notwithstanding judicial decisions to the contrary, the individual
rights advocates are also correct in asserting that the Amendment was
designed to "render possible" such "well regulated militias" by ensuring that
there were ample numbers of armed citizens from which to form them.49
Thus, courts, such as the Eighth Circuit, that lean towards collectivist
theories by insisting that the individual's firearm possession be directly
linked with an organized and governmentally-recognized militia do not seem
to appreciate sufficiently the often ad hoc and somewhat muddled nature of
military formations in the colonial era.5" The Framers' experience led
them to presuppose a populace that not only possessed firearms, but was
familiar with their use. While the Second Amendment certainly encourag-
es-largely for technical, military reasons-the formation of well regulated
militias, the Framers did not contemplate disarming citizens simply because
they were not presently members of one.5
Rather, the Second Amendment reflects the Framers' desire to ensure
that the federal government could never deprive the states of sufficient
armed manpower to support a select-i.e., well organized-militia unit
whenever the states chose to form one.52 In essence, the well regulated
48. See Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis Henigan, The Second Amendment in The
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 57
(1989).
49. Compare Van Alstyne, supra note 38, at 1248-49 (contending that militias were
to be drawn from the people as a whole).
50. See Hale, 978 F.2d at 1020 (citing United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978)) (holding that membership in unorganized
or non-governmental militias is not sufficient to engage Second Amendment privileges);
United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 105-06 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976)
(finding that hypothetical or sedentary militias do not trigger Second Amendment rights).
That the Framers would have made such distinctions is not apparent. Professor Peter
Malowski explained that "[t]he military experiences of the colonial, Revolutionary War, and
early National periods revolved around a 'dual army' of citizen-soldiers and regulars, with
the phrase 'citizen-soldiers' embodying a confusing melange of common militia, volunteer
militia, and nonmilitia volunteers." Peter Malowski, To the Edge of Greatness: The United
States, 1783-1865, in THE MAKING OF STRATEGY 213 (Williamson Murray et al. eds., 1994).
51. See generally David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 1007 (1994) (arguing that the Second Amendment intended to enable both
individuals and individuals acting collectively to resist tyranny); Stephen P. Halbrook, The
Right of the People or Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second
Amendment, 6 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL'Y 69, 127-29 (1994) (arguing that the Second
Amendment did not intend to limit the right to bear arms to persons in actual militia service).
52. In Hale, the Eighth Circuit noted:
When the Second Amendment was ratified in 1791, the state militias functioned as both
the principal units of military organization and as an implicit check on federal power.
These militias were comprised of ordinary citizens who typically were required to
provide their own equipment and arms. The Second Amendment prevented federal laws
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militia was to be drawn from the people at large.5" Furthermore, the
people would not be obliged to seek weapons from a federally-controlled
armory; instead, they would equip themselves with their own personal
weapons. In this way, the repressive instincts of an all-powerful government
could be bridled by the people from whom, by Lockean reasoningi all
.authority to govern was derived.
To eighteenth century Americans, ensuring that the people as a whole
were armed appeared to be a sensible military strategy. When the
Constitution was drafted, many households already owned weapons for self-
protection and hunting purposes,54 thus relieving the government of much
of the expense of arming a fighting force. In addition, confidence existed
in the military capabilities of the armed civilians. Although that conclusion
was disputed by contemporary military experts,55 the United States
Supreme Court in Miller observed that "the common view [was] that
adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia-
civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion."
B. The Second Amendment and the Insurrectionary Theory
Given the perceived fighting potential of armed civilians, it is not sur-
prising that early commentators considered the Second Amendment a
realistic means of resisting tyranny. The celebrated Justice Joseph Story in
his classic Commentaries on the Constitution argued that the Second
Amendment serves "'as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it
offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of
rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance,
that would infringe upon the possession of arms by individuals and thus render the state
militias impotent.
978 F.2d at 1019 (citation omitted). See also infra note 80 (discussing select militias).
53. Oft quoted in this regard is Virginian George Mason who, during the Constitu-
tion's debates, rhetorically asked "Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole
people, except a few public officers." Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional
Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 63 (1989). Similarly, Professor Van
Alstyne cites this passage: "The meaning of the [Second Amendment] undoubtedly is, that
the people, from whom the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms;
and they need no permission or regulation of law for the purpose." Van Alstyne, supra note
38, at 1247 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 270-71 (1880)). See also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (suggesting that the phrase "the people" as used
in the Second Amendment "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community
or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered
part of that community.")
54. See supra note 35 and infra note 98 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 25 and infra note 105 and accompanying text.
56. 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
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enable the people to resist and triumph over them."' 57 Such interpretations
suggest that the Second Amendment is intended to provide the people with
the military potential to resist tyranny originating in government in general,
not just that of the federal authorities.
It is difficult, nonetheless, to find support in the Constitution for the
notion that the Second Amendment is a license for the people to resist and
triumph over government at any level by means of force and violence. 9
To the contrary, the Constitution is replete with provisions intended to quell
uprisings. For example, Congress is empowered to call out the militia-the
very force envisioned to resist usurpations of power-to suppress insurrec-
tions and rebellions.6" Significantly, treason is the only crime the Framers
believed important enough for the Constitution to condemn explicitly.61
In defining the crime, for example, the Constitution expressly lists "levying
war" against the United States as a manifestation of the offense.62 Thus,
the theory that the Second Amendment contemplates armed confrontations
against the government is seriously undermined.
Congress has likewise enacted a series of laws, the majority of which
have withstood constitutional attack, that criminalize conduct aimed at
fostering violent opposition to government authority.63 Though First
Amendment considerations limit the power to restrict speech only to that
speech which is intended to present an imminent threat of the overthrow of
government, 64 little doubt exists that the state may, consonant with the
Constitution, take reasonable measures to protect itself from such an
overthrow.
The Declaration of Independence is also a doubtful source of support for
the proposition of a right to rebel. 65 Though listed in the United States
Code as part of the General Law of the United States, the contemporary
legal import of its specific provisions is unclear. 66 In the pre-Civil War era
57. Quoted in Levinson, supra note 39, at 649 (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTAR-
IES § 1890 (1833)).
58. See generally David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia:
The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 581-84 (discussing the right to
revolution and the Second Amendment in the context of republicanism).
59. See Engdahl, supra note 22, at 35-42 (discussing the Framers' concerns about
rebellions and insurrections).
60. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 15.
61. Id. art. III, § 3.
62. Id. See also 70 AM. JUR. 2D Sedition, Subversive Activities, and Treason § 87
(1987).
63. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-3.
64. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
65. In fact, one of the deprecations that King George III supposedly committed
against the colonists was that "he has excited domestic insurrections amongst us . See
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 31 (U.S. 1776).
66. See William M. Wiecek, Declaration of Independence, in THE OXFORD
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when the rights of states to challenge federal authority were debated, Daniel
Webster opined that the Declaration of Independence did not establish a
right to rebel. 67 During this period, many Southerners argued that seces-
sion was not an act of revolution but rather a legal right of sovereign states
implicit in the Constitution.68 Others, wrote historian James M. McPher-
son, chose to "fall back on the right of revolution" for intellectual support
for their actions.69
Clearly, however, the Civil War itself militates against the insurrection-
ary theory. A nineteenth century writer contended that the Civil War taught
Americans "that 'the sacred right of insurrection' is as much out of place in
a democratic state as in an aristocratic or a monarchical state."7 Ironical-
ly, Abraham Lincoln spoke of the right of revolution in his first inaugural
address. He acknowledged the right but did not rely on the Second
Amendment or any other provision of the Constitution. In Lincoln's view,
the prerogative exists only in an extraconstitutional sense. He explained that
whenever the people "shall grow weary of the existing government, they can
exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right
to dismember, or overthrow it."71
Lincoln further maintained that "[i]t is safe to assert that no government
proper, ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination."72
In Dennis v. United States,73 the Supreme Court expressed a similar view:
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there is a
"right" to rebellion against dictatorial governments is without force where
the existing structure of the government provides for peaceful and orderly
change. We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face
of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical
conclusion, must lead to anarchy.74
Like Lincoln, the Court in Dennis endorsed the notion of a right to
rebellion. If, for example, the "existing structure of the government" fails
to provide for "peaceful and orderly change," then presumably Lincoln and
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 222-23 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
67. Id. at 223.
68. See generally JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 239-46 (1988).
69. Id. at 240.
70. Orestes A. Brownson as quoted in THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL
QUOTATIONS 619-20 (Lewis D. Eigen & Jonathan P. Siegel eds., 1993). Professor Kates
argues that the collectivist or states rights analysis "renders the [Second] [A]mendment little
more than a holdover from an era of constitutional philosophy that received its death knell
in the decision rendered at Appomattox Courthouse." Kates, supra note 35, at 212.
71. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address-Final Text (March 4, 1861), in IV
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, at 269 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
72. Id. at 264.
73. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
74. Id. at 501.
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the Supreme Court would endorse a right to rebellion. Thus, if a right of
insurrection traceable to the Second Amendment exists at all, it arises
validly only when the Constitution's scheme for peaceful and orderly change
is somehow improperly abridged or illegally foreclosed. In short, as long
as the ballot box and the jury box are available, there is no right of recourse
to the cartridge box.
But it may be correctly inferred that the Framers foresaw that in extreme
circumstances armed citizens might need to rise up against tyranny. Such
a drastic situation raises key questions about the Second Amendment: if
despotic leaders emerge and the Constitution's design is nefariously
compromised," does the Second Amendment still provide a realistic means
by which to resist tyranny? Can armed civilians, either as part of a well
regulated militia or as individuals formed into ad hoc militias, still check the
power of a tyrannical standing army?
V. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARMED CIVILIAN
A. Armed Civilians as Citizen-soldiers: Myth or Reality?
"Nations live on myths," says military historian Allan R. Millett, "and
none is more precious ... than the notion of the people in arms springing to
the defense of their homeland."76 To many Second Amendment activists
that concept is no myth; they insist that armed civilians can effectively
spring to the defense of their homeland and the freedoms it implies. They
are convinced that they can do so even in the face of determined modem
armies. Typical is the recent statement of Wayne LaPierre, the chief
executive officer of the National Rifle Association:
The twentieth century provides no example of a determined populace with
access to small arms having been defeated by a modem army. The
Russians lost in Afghanistan, the United States lost in Vietnam, and the
French lost in Indo-China. In each case, it was the poorly armed populace
that beat the "modem" army.... Modem nations like Algeria, Angola,
Ireland, Israel, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe only exist because guerrilla
warfare can triumph over modem armies.77
75. See generally Levinson supra note 39, at 647-48 (text and accompanying notes).
76. Allan R. Millett, The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier, in THE UNITED STATES
MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1989 97 (Richard H.
Kohn ed., 1991).
77. LAPIERRE, supra note 36, at 19-20. See also Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO.
L. J. 309, 316 n.23 (1991) (citing Afghanistan as an example of privately-armed citizens
against an organized army); Dan Gifford & Dave Kopel, Should Jews Think Twice About
Gun Control, JEWISH JOURNAL, Apr. 6, 1993, at 23 (citing Afghanistan, Vietnam, Nicaragua,
Algeria, and Israel); Kates, supra note 35, at 270-71 (citing Vietnam, Afghanistan, Israel,
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To the student of military affairs, trying to link the cited conflicts with
a Second Amendment discussion is all but meaningless. Waging war,
guerrilla7 s or otherwise, is a complicated endeavor involving much more
than mere access to arms. The outcome of such conflicts often depends
upon political79 and social factors. Moreover, a civilian who simply
possesses arms is not necessarily a warfighter of any kind. Thus, relating
access to small arms to competency to wage war requires assumptions
wholly apart from the purview of the Second Amendment. Draftees,
guerrilla fighters, citizen-soldiers such as the National Guard," and
organized militiamen receive at least rudimentary military training, an
Ireland, Algeria, Angola, Rhodesia, and Cuba); Levinson, supra note 39, at 656 (citing
Northern Ireland and the occupied territories of Israel); Lund, supra note 35, at 115 (arguing
that "a relatively poorly armed nation with a small population" recently defeated the United
States, apparently in reference to Vietnam); Reynolds, supra note 35, at 668 (arguing that
whenever the United States comes "up against irregulars with light arms, from Vietnam to
Lebanon to Somalia, [the U.S.] has basically gotten [its] clock[] cleaned").
LaPierre also states: "In China, Cuba, and Nicaragua, the established leaders, Chiang
Kai-shek, Battista, and Somoza lost." LAPIERRE, supra note 36, at 20. In Cuba and
Nicaragua, the insurgencies were not opposed by modern armies comparable to those that
exist in the United States today. Moreover, in China the battle between Chiang Kai-shek's
Nationalists forces and Mao's Communist forces was hardly a guerrilla struggle-both sides
fought with tanks, artillery, aircraft, and hundreds of thousands of troops. See generally R.
ERNEST DUPUY & TREVOR N. DupuY, THE HARPER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY
1423-31 (4th ed. 1993).
78. Guerrilla warfare is but one method of waging war. It can be defined as
"[m]ilitary operations conducted by irregular forces operating within territory nominally
controlled by the enemy (often the country's government), whether independently or as an
adjunct to regular military operations elsewhere." EDWARD LUTTWAK & STUART L. KOEHL,
THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 265 (1991).
79. For example, it was the political backlash in France from the brutality with which
the French military waged its counterinsurgency war, not any defeat by armed civilians, that
caused France to abandon Algeria. See ALISTAIR HORNE, A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE:
ALGERIA 1954-1962 335-40 (1977) (describing how French military success did not lead to
a political solution).
80. The National Guard is not the lineal heir to the unorganized militia of the
Framers' day. Organized state militias from which the National Guard descends were
considered select militias. See Fields & Hardy, supra note 15, at 1-2. The unorganized
militia still exists in law. See 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1988) (An unorganized militia consists of
all men between the ages of 18 and 45, and females who are National Guard officers.).
However, state militias died out as effective organizations in the nineteenth century and were
not revived until the National Guard was established. See Millet, supra note 76. Recent
efforts to revive state militias that are organizationally separate from National Guard units,
and distinct from self-styled civilian militias, have been problematic. See Ed Connolly,
Scandals of the State Militias, THE NATION, Mar. 18, 1991, at 338. Nevertheless, some call
for a revival of state-sponsored militias. See Christopher Hitchens, Minority Report, THE
NATION, Jan. 24, 1994, at 78; Reynolds, supra note 35, at 670-72.
1995]
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
obvious martial benefit that armed civilians do not acquire through the
Second Amendment.
Still, the implications of LaPierre's contentions and those holding similar
views must be addressed." The resolution of this point is not just an
academic exercise; it is critical in determining the extent to which govern-
ment, especially federal government, can constitutionally limit the right to
bear arms. As with other constitutional rights, the application of the Second
Amendment is subject to a balancing of competing individual and societal
interests.82 If, as the Framers envisioned, armed civilians can still serve
credibly as a bulwark against tyranny, then few restrictions on the right to
bear arms are justifiable.
B. The Origin of the Legend
The notion that armed civilians are capable of subduing a highly
sophisticated military such as that of the United States touches on cherished
American ideals. Affection for the concept of armed civilians becoming
citizen-soldiers is as old as the United States itself.83 During the Revolu-
tion, civilian militias fighting behind field fortifications, and frontier
marksmen armed with long-range hunting rifles, initially held regular British
forces at bay.84 Additionally, partisan warfare occurred at various times
throughout the war." The remembrance of gallant Minuteman stands at
Lexington and Concord and the exciting exploits of Francis "Swamp Fox"
Marion's South Carolina irregulars still shape Americans' opinion of the
efficacy of the citizen-soldier in the nation's first war. 6
The idea of armed civilians readily serving as combatants is especially
attractive to Americans because it legitimizes the nation's traditional
81. See generally LAPIERRE, supra note 36.
82. Commentators persuasively argue that restrictions on Second Amendment rights
should be subject to the same kind of balancing of competing interests to which First
Amendment rights are subjected. See, e.g., David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies:
Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633-37
(1986). See also infra note 200.
83. See generally ELIOT A. COHEN, CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS 117-25 (1985)
(discussing the ideological origins of the citizen-soldier concept).
84. See Craig Roberts, Shirtmen to the Rescue, MIL. HIST. Q., June 1991, at 10
(discussing the effectiveness of frontier shirtmen in buying time for the training and raising
of an American army).
85. See, e.g., RICHARD M. KETCHUM, THE WINTER SOLDIERS 385 (1973); RUSSELL
F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR 18-39 (1973).
86. See WEIGLEY. supra note 85, at 17 (discussing Francis Marion and partisan
warfare). Cf Malowski, supra note 50, at 213 ("Following the Revolution the image of
virtuous citizen-soldiers defending their local communities remained a powerful rhetorical
symbol, but the common militia's actual military utility virtually disappeared.").
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antimilitarism t7-a propensity traceable to suspicions about standing
armies-by inferring not only that professional soldiers are unnecessary, but
that the costly development of their supposedly specialized skills is
essentially wasteful. It also patronizes latent American chauvinism by
suggesting that the country's enemies are no match for the innate capabili-
ties of the ordinary American citizen.
The historical record of armed amateurs is, however, much less
sanguine. Reliance on civilian militias during the Revolution soon proved
to be "militarily disastrous.""8 George Washington and other Revolution-
ary leaders quickly demanded the formation of a European-styled Continen-
tal Army when it "became obvious that the militia was no match for trained
British regulars. ' 89 Armed civilians organized into citizen militias did not
determine the Revolution's military success as many believe. Rather, it was
the Continental Army "trained to meet the British on their own terms"9
and the vital assistance of France's military professionals that proved
decisive.9 The romantic, if inaccurate, image of the martial qualities of
the armed civilian has proven to be a tragic one. Dunnigan and Macedonia
contended that the American Revolution "began the dependence on the ill-
trained citizen-soldier and all its attendant costs in terms of losing the first
battles of future wars.
92
Despite harsh lessons on the battlefield,93 the view that the ordinary
civilian is easily converted into an effective soldier continued well into the
twentieth century. When Cold War political exigencies required America
to maintain its first large, peacetime standing army, a vestige of the citizen-
soldier survived as the full-time military was supplemented by short-term
conscripts. But when conscription ended in 1973, America developed an
all-volunteer defense organization 94 which became, to the surprise of many,
the world's most devastatingly effective fighting force.
87. For a discussion of antimilitarism in American society see Charles J. Dunlap Jr.,
Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 341 (1994).
88. PORTER, supra note 18, at 249.
89. JAMES F. DUNNIGAN & RAYMOND M. MACEDONIA, GETTING IT RIGHT:
AMERICAN MILITARY REFORMS AFTER VIETNAM TO THE GULF WAR AND BEYOND 25 (1993).
90. Id.
91. See generally BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE FIRST SALUTE (1988) (discussing the
role of France, especially the French navy, in the military success of the Revolution).
92. DUNNIGAN & MACEDONIA, supra note 89, at 25.
93. See generally AMERICA'S FIRST BATTLES, 1776-1965 (Charles E. Heller &
William A. Stofft eds., 1986).
94. For a discussion of the end of the draft and the impact of social change on the
military see Charles Moskos, From Citizens' Army to Social Laboratory, WILSON Q., Winter
1993, at 83.
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The astounding success of America's regulars9" during the Gulf War
highlights the fact that draftees-who are, as previously noted, better trained
and equipped than the typical armed civilian-can no longer effectively
confront professional armies, even when the civilians significantly outnum-
ber the regulars. Like the collapse of Argentina's sizeable conscript forces
in the face of Britain's highly-regarded professionals during the 1982
Falklands War, the crushing of Iraq's huge and well-armed conscript army
demonstrates that the actual fighting of modem war is too sophisticated for
anyone but the full-time professional to master.96
C. The Armed Civilian and Revolutions in the Art of Warfare
The dismal combat record of amateur soldiers in recent clashes with
professional militaries illustrates that warfare has changed fundamentally
since the Second Amendment was drafted.97 When the Framers considered
using armed civilians to confront a despotic standing army, they were living
"in an age when the weapon likely to be found in private hands, the single
shot musket or pistol, did not differ considerably from its military counter-
part."98 Even more important was the way in which the Framers conceived
of using the masses of civilians.99 Presaging the "nation at arms" strategy
of the Napoleonic era, the Framers assumed that the military principle of
mass would negate any deficiencies in quality. They believed that fire from
masses of militiamen would overwhelm the arguably more accurate shooting
of smaller numbers of regular forces.'0°
Modem technology has changed that equation. Military historian John
Keegan maintains that "high technology weapons make large numbers of
95. See infra note 96.
96. Though the United States depended upon highly-motivated citizen-soldiers of the
National Guard and Reserves for vital support services during the Gulf War, none of their
ground combat maneuver units were deployed. General Thomas Kelly, then Director of
Operations for the Joint Staff, said that part-time soldiers simply did not get enough training
time to be ready for modem combat. Grant Willis, A New Generation of Warriors, NAVY
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1991, at 12. More recently, the General Accounting Office (GAO)
concluded that "[w]ith just 36 days of training a year, it's impossible that National Guard
brigades could step into a wartime role with such short [90 day] notice." See Bill Gertz,
GAO Pans the Bottom-Up Review, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at A22.
97. See generally Andrew F. Krepinevich, Calvary to Computer: The Pattern of
Military Revolutions, THE NAT'L INTEREST, Fall 1994, at 30; James R. Fitzsimonds & Jan
M. Van Tol, Revolutions in Military Affairs, JOINT FORCE Q., Spring 1994, at 24.
98. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 77, at 315.
99. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's reference
to a 500,000 man militia). At the time the Constitution was ratified, professional armies
rarely numbered more than a few thousand troops.
100. Madison conceived a militia that was ten to twelve times the size of the standing
army. See supra note 26.
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soldiers irrelevant."' Since at least the 1920s, America has sought "to
substitute firepower for manpower" in the hopes of limiting casualties.'0 2
So successful has been the effort to use modem weaponry to leverage the
combat power of small numbers of soldiers that Professor Keegan contends
that masses of poorly trained combatants now "simply clutter up the
battlefield."'0 3  According to Keegan, the Framers' concept of mass
warfare is obsolete:
Indeed, when one looks back over the era of mass warfare, what is striking
is how short it was-lasting only from the French Revolution to the end
of the Second World War. The idea on which it was based, "every citizen
a soldier," looks increasingly far-fetched; in truth, most people in Western
societies make bad soldiers.)"
Even in the late eighteenth century, however, the military value of
masses of armed civilians was suspect. General Washington did not believe
that armed civilians, even when organized into partially-trained militias,
could ever match the combat power of professional militaries:
No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force
... The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be
obtained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet
been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and
it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no
longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a depen-
dence.'O0 I
Contrary to the inferences of LaPierre and his adherents, twentieth
century military history shows that the courage and determination of armed
civilians can no longer overcome the discipline, training, and weaponry of
professional soldiers. During World War II-the source of much mythology
about civilian resistance movements springing to the defense of their
homeland after their national armies fell to the Wehrmacht' ° 6-heroic
civilians provided valuable intelligence and occasionally effective sabotage
101. John Keegan, The Warrior's Code of No Surrender, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Jan. 23, 1995, at 47.
102. See Wayne K. Maynard, Spears vs. Rifles: The New Equation of Military Power,
PARAMETERS, Spring 1993, at 51.
103. Keegan, supra note 101, at 47.
104. Id.
105. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations 192 (Robert D. Heini Jr. ed., 1966);
see generally Thomas Fleming, George Washington, General, MIL. HIST. Q., Winter 1990,
at 39-40.
106. See Ted Morgan, When the Maquis Stood and Fought, MIL. HIST. Q., Winter
1990, at 104 (discussing two World War 11 battles that ended disastrously for French maquis
[partisans] "but were pumped up into great heroic actions that the resistance could be proud
or').
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when acting in support of conventional allied forces.1 7 But when the
guerrillas bore arms directly against the troops of the Third Reich, the
military effectiveness of armed civilians typically ranged from "slight"' 0 8
to "disastrous."'' 0 9 One expert notes that "[b]ravery did not compensate
for lack of heavy weapons and inadequate training against German regu-
lars."' 10
There was no shortage of bravery when over a million courageous
citizens of Warsaw, Poland, revolted against Nazi tyranny in 1944. The
German Army,- despite being drained by five years of war, was nevertheless
able to crush the uprising, killing over 215,000 Polish civilians and Under-
ground Army members in the process."' Although some partisan groups
elsewhere in Europe and Russia were able to avoid destruction by retreating
to remote forests and mountains, none succeeded in overthrowing Nazi
rule.' 12
Advocates who insist that the Second Amendment is still a viable check
on tyranny often suggest that lightly-armed civilians could defeat modem
armies by mounting a guerrilla war, selectively pointing to various twentieth
century conflicts as evidence of the same." 3 In reality, however, no
insurgents armed only with the sort of personal weapons contemplated by
the Second Amendment have prevailed, in a military sense, over any
authentically modem army.
D. Second Amendment- Weaponry and Modern Conflicts
The kind of armament protected by the Second Amendment is actually
quite limited. As Second Amendment scholar Don B. Kates concludes, the
reference to the bearing of arms shows that the Framers intended to protect
only those personal firearms that could be physically carried." 4  Crew-
served weapons, such as heavy machine guns and artillery, are not,
therefore, covered by the Second Amendment.
107. See. e.g., GORDON WRIGHT, THE ORDEAL OF TOTAL WAR 149 (1968).
108. Id.
109. See KENNETH MACKSEY, WEAPONS AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 158 (1993).
110. Id.
Ill. See WINSTON CHURCHILL, MEMOIRS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 846-53
(Bonanza Books abridged ed. 1978) (1959) (writing that the Soviets misled the Polish
Underground Army into believing that the uprising would coincide with a major Soviet
offensive). See also Marshall Brement, Why Didn't the Soviets Take Warsaw?, MIL. HIST.
Q., Spring 1994, at 80 (contending that the Soviets were unable to take Warsaw and that the
delay was not intended to destroy the anti-communist underground).
112. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, TECHNOLOGY AND WAR 302-03 (rev. ed. 1991).
113. See generally MICHAEL CARVER, WAR SINCE 1945 12-43, 83-100 (1981)
(discussing the twentieth century conflicts where insurrectionary movements have been
successfully suppressed such as the British did in Borneo, Malaya, and Kenya).
114. See Kates, supra note 35, at 219-20, 261.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court indicated in Miller that to enjoy Second
Amendment protection, the weapon must have "some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.""' 5  In the
Framers' day, militia armament included little more than a musket and
bayonet.'16 Thus, weapons other than those that are descendants of the
ordinary military equipment of a militia are beyond the Amendment's
scope.'17 Simply because a weapon is capable of being physically borne
by an individual does not mean that it is covered by the Second Amendment
either. Weapons typically limited to specially-trained regular military
formations are not militia arms and are not protected by the Second
Amendment."' Excluded from Second Amendment coverage, therefore,
are such devices as grenades and rockets which even in colonial times were
the province of elite regular army units." 9
Unlike eighteenth century warfare, modern warfighting, including
guerrilla warfare, is not organized around the firepower of the personal
115. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
116. As evidence of the Framers' understanding as to what constituted militia weapons,
the Militia Act of 1792 required every able bodied male to "provide himself with a good
musket or firelock" as well as a bayonet. Horsemen required pistols. 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
117. 307 U.S. at 178; see also Williams, supra note 58, at 557 (arguing that Miller
limits the scope of the Amendment to arms suitable for use by militia).
118. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 770 (1943) (discussing Miller and noting that all kinds of small arms were used by
commando units during World War II). The mere fact that a weapon might be used by an
elite regular army unit does not mean that it is a weapon appropriate for use by lightly-
trained militia. Commentators have misread Miller to suggest that a weapon need only be
used by some part of the military to qualify for Second Amendment protection. See, e.g.,
Levinson, supra note 39, at 654-55. In support of their assertion, they cite the Court's
comment in Miller that "[c]ertainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon [a sawed-
off shotgun] is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute
to the common defense." 307 U.S. at 178. As used in Miller, judicial notice of a fact does
not equate with a finding of Second Amendment protection. Rather, it is simply a condition
precedent to evaluating whether or not a weapon so defined bears, as the Court said in
Miller, "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia." ld. Even in the Framers' day, not every military weapon was ordinary militia
equipment. Consequently, the arms mentioned in the First Militia Act were limited to those
kinds of weapons that the ordinary citizen would likely possess and know how to use without
specialized training resident in full-time military units. See infra notes 119-21. Moreover,
it is unlikely that the Framers intended to place volatile, militarily-unique weapons and
armament in citizen's homes. See infra note 184.
119. Though grenades existed in the eighteenth century, there is no evidence that they
were a militia weapon; indeed, these dangerously volatile weapons were carried, if at all,
only by specially designated grenadier units within the standing armies. See Harry F. Tracy,
Grenadier's Elite Status, MIL. HIST. Q., Aug. 1986, at 18; see also Hardy, supra note 82, at
636 (contending that restricting the possession of weapons that the Framers could not have
foreseen "does no violence to the freedoms the Framers sought to protect").
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weapons carried by individual combatants. As a result, virtually all
insurgencies that achieved any modicum of success in the twentieth century
have relied on the kind of lethal arms that are beyond the scope of Second
Amendment protections. For this reason the 1989 Russian withdrawal from
Afghanistan cannot be cited as an example of a poorly armed populace
defeating a modem army. To the contrary, the often half-hearted Russian
military effort enjoyed success until the United States furnished Stinger
antiaircraft missiles to the mujahideen rebels. 2° Though man-portable and
operated by a single individual, the cumbersome Stinger 12 is not part of
the personal arms issue of individual soldiers of any professional army, let
alone a militia.
The Vietnam conflict is also frequently cited as an example of a poorly
armed populace that defeated a superpower. Military analyst and Vietnam
veteran Colonel Harry G. Summers finds that many Americans still
erroneously believe that "the war was lost to pajama-clad Viet Cong
guerrillas, armed only with primitive weapons and revolutionary fervor."'
122
According to Summers and most military experts, that conclusion could not
be more wrong. It was, instead, a massive "North Vietnamese, 22 division,
cross-border blitzkrieg, supported by tanks, missiles, and heavy artillery-
not Viet Cong guerrillas-that finally overwhelmed South Vietnam in the
spring of 1975. 'I23
The war's armed civilians, the Viet Cong, were effectively destroyed
(largely by American soldiers) during the Tet offensive of 1968.124
Militarily, United States forces never lost a battle to Viet Cong or North
Vietnamese troops.121 In fact, North Vietnamese strategy always contem-
plated that the revolutionary effort would require an invasion of the south
120. See generally John Loudermilk, Hind Hunter, MOD. WARFARE, Nov. 1989, at 12
(discussing the adverse effect of the Stinger missile on Russian air mobility and firepower).
121. The Stinger missile system is five feet long and weighs over thirty-three pounds.
THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 567 (Edward Luttwak & Stuart L. Koehl eds., 1991).
By comparison, the M16 assault rifle is just over three feet long and weighs only eight
pounds. Id. at 367.
122. Harry G. Summers, Troops Equal to Any, VIETNAM, Summer 1988, at 21.
123. Id.
124. See C. James Novak, Turning the Tide in Vietnam, RETIRED OFFICER, Feb. 1995,
at 52 ("Enemy troop losses were estimated at between 30,000 and 50,000, and the ranks of
Viet Cong insurgents had been decimated."). The North Vietnamese leaders who planned
the offensive knew that if it failed, as it did, the bulk of the Viet Cong would be destroyed.
As the Viet Cong were mostly from the°South, their destruction would eliminate a force
which "increasingly opposed northern domination." See DUNNIGAN & MACEDONIA, supra
note 89, at 91; see also Capt. Ronnie E. Ford, Window of Opportunity, VIETNAM, Feb. 1995,
at 38 (indicating that the North Vietnamese intended to defeat the United States psychologi-
cally rather than militarily by the Tet offensive).
125. See generally EDWIN P. HOYT, AMERICA'S WARS & MILITARY EXCURSIONS 470-
77 (1987).
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by conventional military forces.'26 Notably, it was only after the last
troops of America's modem army departed in 1973 that North Vietnamese
regulars accompanied by main battle tanks were able to sweep into Saigon.
Nor were the French defeated in Vietnam by guerrillas simply armed
with Second Amendment-type weaponry. The cataclysmic event of France's
colonial war was its 1954 defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu. One of the
most dramatic sieges in the history of warfare, it was won not by small
arms, but by the prolonged effect of colossal artillery barrages. 127 By the
end of the battle, Viet Minh artillerymen had fired more than 130,000
rounds from over 200 heavy cannons and mortars. 128 Highlighting the use
of non-Second Amendment weaponry, the final insurgent assault was
preceded by a bombardment by Soviet-built Katyusha multiple-rocket
launchers.1
29
Similarly, France was not militarily defeated in Algeria. 30 Stung by
its withdrawal from Vietnam, French forces innovatively employed technolo-
gy to counter the insurgents: helicopters located and destroyed guerillas in
the desert, and electronic fences backed by mine fields limited rebel move-
ments.' 31  In addition, French paratroopers successfully used torture to
obtain key information from captured insurgents.'3 2 "In strictly military
terms," an expert concludes, "the Algerian war ended in defeat for the Front
for National Liberation."' 3
These conflicts teach that twentieth century insurgencies do not, in fact,
rely on light, Second Amendment-type armament. Even more important for
Second Amendment purposes, the uprisings neither depended upon, nor were
facilitated by, an individual right to bear arms. In virtually all of the
purported successes, there was no such right. Rebels routinely obtained
weapons from outside sources or captured them from government
troops. 134  Thus, if one accepts the proposition that such struggles were
126. David T. Zabecki & Richard P. Montpelier, Unlimited Expense Account,
VIETNAM, Fall 1988, at 43, 47.
127. See Janos Radvanyi, Dien Bien Phu: Thirty Years After, in THE PARAMETERS OF
WAR 67 (1987); ROBERT B. ASPREY, WAR IN THE SHADOWS 891-92 (1975).
128. COL. J.D. MORELOCK, THE ARMY TIMES BOOK OF GREAT LAND BATTLES 262
(1994); see also WILLIAM SEYMOUR, GREAT SIEGES OF HISTORY 297-318 (1991) (discussing
Dien Bien Phu and General Vo Nguyen Giap's failure to repeat his victory fourteen years
later against the Americans at the siege of Khe Sanh in 1968).
129. See Radvanyi, supra note 127, at 67.
130. Charles Townsend, Guerrilla War, in THE WORLD ATLAS OF WARFARE 261
(Richard Holmes ed., 1988).
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also Home, supra note 79, at 335-40 (describing how French military
success did not lead to a political solution).
133. GERARD CHALIAND, REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 69 (1989).
134. For example, Richard Reeves noted that the "Viet Cong mostly used weapons
captured from [the Army of the Republic of Vietnam]." RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT
1995]
TENNESSEE LAW RE VIEW
successful, then the real lesson is that the protections of the Second
Amendment are apparently unnecessary. The point is that civilians
determined to resist their government have historically been able to procure
weapons without the benefit of any constitutional provisions that ensured
them a right to keep and bear arms.
E. Weaponry of Modern Armies
It is a mistake, of course, to dismiss the potential military problem
presented by eighty million 135 Americans armed with 222 million fire-
arms. 36 But to a modem military, the numbers are not quite as daunting
as they might seem. Millions of weapons that are inoperable, antique arms
of little or no combat value, and weapons in possession of those who cannot
or will not operate them in a combat environment would be discounted from
those figures.
37
Moreover, almost none of the remaining weapons would have much
effect against the tens of thousands of tanks and armored vehicles possessed
by the United States military. It is difficult to overestimate the shock effect
of tanks and armored vehicles on combatants armed only with Second
Amendment-type weaponry. Even the trained soldier will falter in the face
of an armored attack if inadequately armed.'38 Thus, the rapid deployment
of Soviet armor quickly suppressed the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and a
similar use of Chinese tanks crushed the student rebellion in Tiananmen
Square in 1989.
The shock effect of heavy weapons is not a particularly new phenome-
non in the American experience. Shay's Rebellion, a 1787 Massachusetts
debtor's revolt and one of the few domestic insurgencies in United States
history, collapsed in the face of such arms. During the first and only battle
of the rebellion, the commander of the government forces, after firing a
warning barrage,
then ordered the fieldpieces aimed and fired directly into the midst of the
rebels. Again the guns roared. Men fell mangled. Four crumpled forms
lay dead or dying when the smoke dissipated. The survivors, unprepared
to stand up to artillery, broke and ran. The only battle of the rebellion was
over. For all of their numbers and anger, the Shaysites had never
KENNEDY: PROFILE OF POWER 608 (1993).
135. Robert Davis & Haya El Nasser, NRA Sees a Change: 'Our Agenda is Now', USA
TODAY, Dec. 28, 1994, at 2A (quoting Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association).
136. Id. at 1A (no source cited).
137. For example, some guns are inherited by non-users.
138. See RICHARD HOLMES, ACTS OF WAR: THE BEHAVIOR OF MEN IN BATTLE 226-
27 (1985) (describing the panic that can occur among soldiers when weapons expected to
stop tanks fail).
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developed the discipline and will necessary to make a fighting force
effective.'
39
Without the ability to counter heavy weapons, even a well-manned
insurgency cannot win a pitched battle against forces so equipped. 4 ' It
was the lavish use of heavy weapons, for example, that enabled the Russian
Army-a force so decayed it can no longer be considered modem by United
States standards"'4 -to drive rugged Chechen rebels from their capital of
Grozny in early 1995.42
F. The Cost-Benefit/Deterrence Theory
Some commentators contend that it would not be necessary for armed
civilians to win a pitched battle or, for that matter, to actually defeat a
modem army at [a]ll. 1' They argue that it is only necessary to make an
insurgency too costly for the professionals to suppress. In this way, it is
assumed, armed civilians could deter tyranny by making the price of seizing
power too high.144 Essentially, Second Amendment advocates propound
a sort of cost-benefit/deterrence theory. Supporters point to the fact that
Switzerland, where militiamen kept their personal weapons in their homes,
was not invaded during World War II as evidence of utility of this cost-
benefit/deterrence theory. One commentator claims that "the Germans were
afraid to invade in both world wars, knowing as they did that every man
was armed.'
'1 45
Actually, the Germans had little regard for Swiss military capabilities.
Hitler sneered at the militiamen, ridiculing them for "playing at sol-
diers."'146  The Swiss saved themselves not by making the Germans fear
them, but by producing arms and munitions for the Nazis, assistance that
139. Palmer, supra note 32, at 81-82.
140. For example, Geoffrey Perret argued that the mountain howitzer was the "gun that
won the West." PERRET, supra note 38, at 140. Perret noted that "[t]ime and again a single
howitzer firing canister saved heavily outnumbered troops from annihilation. Indians were
rightly terrified of a weapon that could kill twenty men at half a mile." Id.
141. See generally William Matthews, An Army of 'Toy Soldiers, 'AIR FORCE TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1995, at 16; Bruce B. Auster, Cold, Underfed, Underpaid, Unprepared and Over
There, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 9, 1995, at 37; Fred Hiatt, A Military Machine
Showing Its Rust, THE WASH. POST NAT'L WEEKLY ED., Jan. 23-29, 1995, at 14 (all
describing the decrepit state of Russian forces sent to Chechnya).
142. See generally Steve Levine & Karen Breslau, Dire Tales of a Dirty War,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 40 ("Russia's wholesale bombardment of Chechnya's capital,
Grozny, was the most brutal military offensive by a big power in recent history.").
143. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 35, at 115; Levinson, supra note 39, at 657.
144. See. e.g., Kates, supra note 35, at 270-71; Lund, supra note 35, at 122.
145. LAPIERRE, supra note 36, at 170.
146. MARTIN GILBERT, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY 225 (1989).
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gained importance as German factories came under increasing air attack. 47
Significantly, the Swiss today are abandoning their strategy of masses of
static militiamen in favor of a smaller, more modem, and more mobile
force. 1
48
The cost-benefit/deterrence theory seems to draw strength from the
record of independence movements that arose in the Third World after
World War II. In many cases a European colonial power, though not
militarily defeated, nonetheless concluded that the expense of waging a
counterinsurgency war made retaining control of a foreign territory a poor
investment. 149  But the considered decisions of Western democracies
fighting colonial wars are questionable models from which to suppose the
actions of domestic tyrants that the Second Amendment aims to resist.
Tyrants rarely engage in or are deterred by the rational calculations that
underpin the cost-benefit/deterrence theory.
50
Moreover, conflicts like those waged by colonial powers in the post-
World War II era do not, according to Professor Eliot A. Cohen, "engage
the full energies of a World Power's armed forces or population."''
Cohen surmised that "[r]ather than summon up all its physical and emotional
resources to win such wars, a World Power will often accept compromise
or even a limited defeat."' 52 Suffice to say, tyrants-especially those
engaged in a domestic usurpation of power-are loathe to accept compro-
mise or limited defeat.
Unlike a foreign power battling to retain a colony, a domestic insurrec-
tion against dictatorial authorities would summon all the resources of the
native government under attack. For this reason a guerrilla war aimed at
expelling a foreign occupier is altogether different from one directed against
internal usurpations of power. Plainly, it is one thing to withdraw from a
former colony, and quite another to capitulate in a civil war. Opponents
fight civil wars so brutally because they know that there is, literally,
147. See GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF
WORLD WAR II 397 (1994). Switzerland's putative neutrality protected their arms factories.
Id. But see COHEN, supra note 83, at 72 (arguing that the number of forces the Germans
planned to use to invade Switzerland reflected a "healthy respect for the ability of the Swiss
to fend off a conventional assault").
148. Brooks Tigner, Swiss Revise Military Posture, DEFENSE NEWS, Jan. 9-15, 1995,
at 4, 28.
149. See AsPREY, supra note 127, at 856-57. One textbook example is British
operations against Jewish insurgents in Palestine after World War 11. Shortly after Winston
Churchill warned Parliament that no interests in Palestine were worth the eighty million
pound cost, Britain terminated its UN mandate there. Id.
150. Typically, tyrants are convinced of their own omnipotence and are, in any event,
grossly indifferent to the suffering of their people and even the military forces supporting
them; Hitler is the archetype, Saddam Hussein the current paradigm.
151. COHEN, supra note 83, at 31.
152. Id.
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nowhere to go. Consider that the Civil War remains America's most bloody
and destructive war. 1
53
Civil wars graphically illustrate the most serious flaw in the cost-
benefit/deterrence theory: the armed civilians expected to oppose domestic
tyranny would presumably make the very same kind of rational cost-benefit
calculation and, assuming the absence of megalomania in the population at
large, are more likely to do so. But such calculations may not have the
patriotic effect Second Amendment advocates desire. How many gun
owners, for example, would choose to cast their lot with the forces of
tyranny? The weapons-related crime statistics suggest that enormous
numbers of civilians already use their guns for malevolent purposes.' 54
Further, how much suffering will casualty-sensitive Americans of the
late twentieth century be willing to visit upon themselves and their families
before submission becomes the preferable, or only, option? Make no
mistake about it, modem armies are exquisitely adept at wreaking misery on
resisting peoples. Regular military forces have historically been able to
disproportionately inflict casualties on insurgent forces and the populaces
that support them. For example, for every German soldier killed in
suppressing the Warsaw uprising, more than twenty Poles died.'55
Similarly, in Algeria seven insurgents died for every French soldier
killed.'56 Even inept Russian forces of 1995 managed to kill more than
four times the number of Chechens than they themselves lost.'57
History also shows that the United States military has been effective-
sometimes brutally so-in crushing insurrections. Native American
resistance,15 as well as uprisings in the Philippines, Cuba, Nicaragua,
Haiti, and Mexico were all suppressed with relatively low losses among
United States troops. 1 In the attack on United States Rangers in Moga-
153. See generally CHARLES ROYSTER, THE DESTRUCTIVE WAR (1991) (discussing the
sheer violence with which the Civil War was waged).
154. See generally Nicholas Dixon, Why We Should Ban Handguns in the United
States, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 243 (1993) (discussing the use of handguns in crime).
See also infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for law-abiding gun
owners to support a despotic regime that shrouds itself with a veneer of legality).
155. See supra note I I I and accompanying text.
156. R. ERNEST DuPUY & TREVOR N. DUPUY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY
1314 (Rev. ed. 1977).
157. See Steven Erlanger, A Famous Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at A4 (citing
Russian officers' estimates of deaths five times higher than the 907 officially reported, as
well as estimates of twenty thousand Chechen deaths by Sergei N. Yushenkov, head of the
Russian Parliament's defense committee).
158. See WEIGLEY, supra note 85, at 153-63 (arguing that the United States military
waged a campaign of annihilation against native Americans).
159. See, e.g., Milt Machlin, Sunday Morning Ambush, MIL. HIST. Q., Aug. 1987, at
27 (discussing a bloody attack by insurgents armed only with sword-like bolos where an
isolated United States army unit was overrun). However, despite the insurgent victory, the
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dishu in October 1993, Somali gunmen killed eighteen Americans, but at the
price of hundreds of Somali lives.
61
Perhaps the best example of how regular military forces can suppress
even highly-motivated armed civilians is the Boer Wars of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century. Tough, dedicated, and well-armed,
"Boer fighting-men basically were farmers formed into commandos to
defend their perceived homeland and way of life-every one of them a
superb marksman."'' 6  Despite a lack of discipline, the Boer farmers
fought a brilliant guerrilla campaign and were sometimes able to prevail
over British regulars. But ultimately-and what happens ultimately is what
counts-they were defeated. During the Second Boer War the "British
burned [Boer] homes, slaughtered their cattle and destroyed their crops.
[The British] invented the first modem concentration camp and herded the
families of Boer guerrillas into them."'' 62 By destroying the Boer base of
support, the British effectively ground down resistance.
To succeed, a guerilla movement needs secure bases from which to
operate. 63 Che Guevera, the famous Marxist revolutionary, was eventual-
ly hunted down and killed when he tried to communize Bolivia without first
establishing a secure base. 6I Though troubling to conceive, a despotic
regime strong enough to gain power in a large, diverse nation like the
United States would probably be clever enough to shroud its actions with
a pretense of legality. The net effect is that millions, including gun owners,
who consider themselves law-abiding citizens might be misled into
supporting such a government. Thus, the armed civilians attempting to
conduct a guerilla war in the United States might well find themselves
battling not only security forces, but their fellow citizens as well. 165
Furthermore, industrialized countries like the United States have
pervasive information technologies and elaborate intelligence systems that
technological differences were revealing: some 250 insurrectionists were killed in the attack
which claimed the lives of just 36 United States soldiers. The Americans, however, were
armed with modem Krag-Jorgensen rifles. Such lopsided body counts typified the conflict.
Id. at 29, 33. See generally HOYT, supra note 125, at 297-329 (discussing various United
States military responses to insurrections in overseas areas).
160. The Washington Post quoted an unnamed intelligence officer who estimated the
Somali death toll at 350. John Lancaster, Mission Incomplete, Rangers Pack Up, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al.
161. See William Weir, Advantage Sought on High Ground, MIL. HIST. Q., Aug. 1986,
at 34.
162. Id. at 40.
163. See ARCHER JONES, THE ART OF WAR IN THE WESTERN WORLD 680-81 (1987).
164. See Michael Roberts, Ambush in the Red Zone, MODERN WARFARE, Sept. 1989,
at 34.
165. See also supra note 154 and accompanying text, indicating that in addition to
those who might support a despotic regime because they are deceived about its legitimacy,
there are those who would support it for nefarious reasons.
[Vol. 62:643
INSURRECTIONARY THEORY
leave few places for armed resistance groups of any significance to hide.
In our electronically bureaucratized society, financial transactions, transpor-
tation arrangements, communications, and all the other components of an
insurgency movement are subject to monitoring and discovery by determined
security forces.'66 Historian Martin van Creveld has concluded that such
factors create a situation where "successful guerilla warfare [can] no longer
be waged in any of the more highly developed continents."'67
In addition, modem militaries, and particularly the United States military
since Vietnam, have developed sophisticated counterinsurgency instruction
programs. Today, the United States fields 46,000 elite troops specially
trained in such warfare.' 68 Ingenious counterinsurgency techniques
combined with new technologies 69 enable contemporary military forces
to subdue the most intransigent opponents. For example, by the time the
Palestinians gave up trying to destroy Israel militarily, Israeli security forces
had reduced the intifadah to little more than bands of stone-throwing
children. 7 ' The Irish Republican Army-sometimes cited by Second
Amendment activists as an example of the effectiveness of armed civilians
in the face of a modem army-gave up armed resistance in 1994, after
twenty-five years of struggle. 7 ' The IRA not only failed to dislodge the
British army but succeeded only in earning the antipathy of their own
people.
G. Armed Americans and Modern Insurgents
Unlike armed civilians organized into ad hoc combat formations, modem
security forces have the advantage of a developed sense of unit cohesion and
fighting spirit. Regardless of how well motivated, armed civilians simply
cannot replicate the esprit and unit pride that sustains the professional in the
psychological crucible of combat. In particular, history shows that twentieth
century Americans profit greatly from the psychological preparation for
166. Compare Vic Sussman, Policing Cyberspace, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
23, 1995, at 55 (discussing the capabilities to acquire information through computer
technology).
167. VAN CREVELD, supra note 112, at 302-03.
168. See DOUGLAS C. WALLER, THE COMMANDOS: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S
SECRET SOLDIERS 33 (1994).
169. See generally JOHN P. HOLMS & TOM BURKE, TERRORISM 212-46 (1994)
(discussing counterterrorism resources).
170. STEPHEN C. PELLETIER, HAMAS AND HIZBOLLAH: THE RADICAL CHALLENGE TO
ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 21 (1994) ("Violence continues, mostly in the form
of rock-throwing attacks .... The rock attacks are the work of children, some as young as
8 or 9 years.... Children have always been involved in the intifadah, but not until recently
have they taken charge.").
171. See generally Simon Winchester, Eternal Argument, MIL. HIST. Q., Aug. 1994,
at 34.
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combat that professional militaries typically achieve. As one illustration,
Colonel Summers relates a study of two divisions who fought side-by-side
during World War II in the North African campaign.172  "The regular
division," Summers reports, "suffered almost no 'battle fatigue." ' 73 But
the reserve division, composed of soldiers recently drawn from civilian life,
was almost incapacitated. "The only variable was unit pride," says
Summers. 
7 4
The psychological aspect of conflict makes comparisons of various late
twentieth century conflicts with a potential insurgency in the United States
especially suspect. Second Amendment advocates are profoundly mistaken
if they equate armed American civilians with the warrior cultures emerging
in places like Afghanistan, Somalia, Chechnya, the Balkans, and elsewhere.
Such peoples, according to Professor Keegan, are psychologically distinct
from Western societies in that "they are brought up to fight, think fighting
honorable and think killing in warfare honorable."'' 75  Military analyst
Ralph Peters paints an even darker picture of what he calls the "new warrior
class."' 76 Peters describes them not as soldiers, but rather as:
erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no
stake in civil order .... men who have acquired a taste for killing, who do
not behave rationally according to our definition of rationality, who are
capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive powers of language, and
who will sacrifice their own kind in order to survive .... [They are men]
for whom treachery is routine.'77
Such warriors are completely inapposite to the kind of democratic
patriot disposed to resist tyranny that the Second Amendment visualizes. To
confront the new warrior class, United States and other Western armies
selectively recruit and intensively develop elite units that cultivate a warrior
spirit in strictly disciplined and controlled conditions. If armed civilians,
without the benefit of a specialized training scheme, were to attempt to
somehow match the fierceness of the new warriors, they would likely
convert themselves into the very tyrants they supposedly would be fighting
to defeat.
In short, whatever success the new warrior cultures enjoy, they do not
create a model for advocates of the military capabilities of armed civilians
in this country to emulate; the paradigm simply has no counterpart in the
traits of the people who comprise the populace of industrialized nations like
172. Harry G. Summers, Noble Casualty of Defense Reductions, WASH. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1994, at 25 (citing study by Carl Menninger).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Keegan, supra note 101.
176. Ralph Peters, The New Warrior Class, PARAMETERS, Summer 1994, at 24.
177. Id. at 16, 24.
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the United States. Merely putting weapons into the hands of a willing
civilian does not a soldier, or warrior, make.
H. Terrorism and the Second Amendment
It is true that insurgencies that resort to terrorism continue to vex
security forces.'78 But the weapon of choice for the terrorist is not the
kind of armament the Second Amendment seeks to protect; rather, it is the
bomb.'79 Besides not being an ordinary militia weapon, it is inconceivable
that the Framers would have countenanced any device with the express aim
of causing significant noncombatant casualties.
The eighteenth century was the age of limited war with its attendant
restraints on unchivalrous behavior.' ° According to political scientist
Bruce D. Porter, the eighteenth century was an era "more mindful of the
need to avoid civilian casualties."'' Colonial Americans were also
sensitive to noncombatant casualties. The Declaration of Independence
deprecates King George III for failing to protect noncombatants from Indian
attacks. 182 Moreover, given the Framers' English heritage, it is unlikely
that they would seek constitutional protection for the means by which a Guy
Fawkes-like183 strategy could be implemented.'8
A more practical problem in employing terrorism as a means of
insurrection is that it has "yet to win a victory anywhere."'8 5 Professor
van Creveld points out that while "great damage may be done by striking
at well-chosen pinpoint targets," it is unlikely that a modem country would
be disabled. 86 Developed countries, he notes, have "multiple, redundant,
178. See generally HOLMS & BURKE, supra note 169.
179. See generally id. at 160-82.
180. See generally CHRISTOPHER DUFFY, THE MILITARY EXPERIENCE INTHE AGE OF
REASON 12-13 (1987).
181. PORTER, supra note 18, at 108.
182. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 31 (U.S. 1776).
183. Guy Fawkes was a seventeenth century Catholic who was caught attempting to
blow up parliament and the Protestant King James I. The anniversary of his capture is still
celebrated in England. See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING
PEOPLES 151 (1957).
184. As Professor Kates noted:
[Aiccording to Blackstone and Hawkins, the common-law right [to keep and bear arms]
did not extend to "dangerous or unusual weapons" whose mere possession or exhibition
"are apt to terrify the people." Naturally, it would terrify the citizenry for unauthorized
individuals to possess weapons that could not realistically be used even in self-defense
without endangering innocent people in adjacent areas or buildings.
Kates, supra note 35. at 261.
185. John Shy & Thomas W. Collier, Revolutionary War, in MAKERS OF MODERN
STRATEGY 815, 858 (Peter Paret et al. eds., 1986).
186. VAN CREVELD, supra note 112, at 307-08.
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communication and transport networks" that are extremely difficult to
destroy. 187
Another terroristic tactic that could be employed is assassination.
Though the elites in dictatorial regimes would no doubt take extraordinary
measures to protect themselves, armed civilians equipped with Second
Amendment-type weaponry could, theoretically, launch such attacks. Like
the effect of isolated bombings, however, Professor van Creveld doubts the
effectiveness of assassination in an industrialized country like the United
States. He notes that modem nations are "complex organizations, and the
vast technological systems on which they rest, can absorb isolated at-
tacks."'88 Furthermore, van Creveld contends:
Indeed, one of the most important hallmarks of modernity is precisely the
fact that political and other organizations are no longer dependent on a
single person and that, consequently, little can be accomplished by
eliminating him. As countless examples from the assassination of Kennedy
to that of Anwar Sadat show, in today's developed world a leader who is
killed or incapacitated will promptly be replaced by another. 89
V. THE POWER OF THE UNARMED CITIZENRY
Paradoxically, unarmed citizens have been most problematic for
governmental authorities in the United States during the last half of the
twentieth century. 9 ° The civil rights struggles of the 1960s were won not
by force of arms, but by peaceful protest and civil disobedience. 19' Where
the government tried to use force against unarmed resisters, the results were
often counter-productive. The spectacle of fire hoses and police attack dogs
employed against civil rights protesters galvanized public opinion against
discriminatory practices. Similarly, when National Guardsmen fired upon
187. Id.
188. Id. at 305.
189. Id. But see HERBERT L. ABRAMS, "THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT,"
CONFUSION, DISABILITY, & THE 25TH AMENDMENT (1994) (discussing potential difficulties
of Presidential succession).
190. Indeed, the success of nonviolence in social transformations predates the last half
of the twentieth century. Peter F. Drucker observed:
Chroniclers of the rise of the industrial worker tend to highlight the violent
episodes-especially the clashes between strikers and the police, as in America's
Pullman strike. The reason is probably that the theoreticians and propagandists of
socialism, anarchism, and communism. . . incessantly wrote and talked of "revolution"
and "violence." Actually, the rise of the industrial worker was remarkably nonviolent.
Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Social Transformation, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1994,
at 59.
191. But see Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 77, at 349-58 (noting that armed
volunteers sometimes protected civil rights workers).
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unarmed students during an anti-war protest at Kent State University in
1970,'92 the tragedy became an important influence in reversing policy on
Vietnam.
Conversely, armed resistance has a dismal record of success in American
history. Indeed, it has rarely been necessary to use the military to subdue
the few attempts that have arisen in recent years. Suppression of such
armed groups as the Black Panthers, white supremacist organizations, and
Middle Eastern terrorists was accomplished by orthodox police forces with
little resort to the extensive combat capabilities of the military. Similarly,
even the relatively well-armed followers of David Koresh in Waco, Texas,
were devastated by law enforcement authorities who, despite the use of a
weaponless armored vehicles, were lightly equipped by military standards.
Armed actions, even in support of philosophies with which many
Americans have sympathy, are frequently viewed by the public with
hostility. Thus, shootings by anti-abortion activists have done more to
undermine the movement than any pro-choice endeavors. In this regard the
Waco incident is illustrative.
Though government authorities may have acted improperly and even
unlawfully during the raid,' 93 public opinion polls nonetheless found
overwhelming support for the forceful way in which the government dealt
with Koresh's armed resistance to Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms agents. 94
The power of an unarmed citizenry is not idiosyncratic with the
American experience.195 India achieved its independence via the nonvio-
lent tactics of Mahatma Ghandi. Similarly, communism in Europe and the
Soviet Union ended not by force of arms, but by generally peaceful social
transformation. The latter phenomenon is particularly instructive because
it took place in the face of vast military machines built by the totalitarian
regimes. Incongruously, it appears that a despotic state may even be
strengthened by an armed insurrectionary movement. Professor Porter
explained:
192. See MICHAEL MACLEAR, THE TEN THOUSAND DAY WAR 296-98 (1981).
193. See Paul H. Blackman, The Tragedy at Waco, 6 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL'Y
165 (1994).
194. As Millions Cheered, THE PROGRESSIVE, June 1993, at 8. Similarly, following
the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, in which an individual associated with
civilian militias is the main suspect, a poll found that 80% of Americans described members
of such organizations as "dangerous" and 63% described them as "a threat to our way of
life." See Smolowe, supra note 3, at 60 (citing an April 27, 1995 Time/CNN telephone poll
of 600 adult Americans).
195. See generally GENE SHARP, MAKING EUROPE UNCONQUERABLE (1985) (discussing the
history of the success of nonviolent civilian-based defense and proposing an expanded
scheme for the defense of Europe).
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The keeping up of perpetual civil war [is] another key to power of the
totalitarian states .... The mobilization of hatred help[s] to maintain the
revolutionary ardor necessary for the totalitarian movements to thrive.
Indeed, if tangible domestic enemies could not be readily identified it
would have been necessary to invent them.196
Thus, to the extent that the Second Amendment is aimed at providing the
masses with a means of resisting tyranny by force, it no longer retains credibility.
Indeed, the revolutions in warfare have rendered obsolete the notion of armed
civilians checking the power of modem, professional militaries.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
No system of government can allow for its own demise by violent overthrow.
While a theoretical basis for the Second Amendment might guarantee access to
firearms by other than the professional armies of the federal govemment, the
Second Amendment does not sanction armed revolt by the citizenry. That right
exists, if at all, only when the Constitution's system for peaceful change ceases
to function; it does not arise where a group-armed or otherwise----simply dislikes
or disagrees with a particular government decision or policy.
Furthermore, possession of small arms, including assault-type weapons, does
not meaningfully check the combat power of advanced military establishments
like those of the United States. To suggest that civilians equipped with Second
Amendment-type weapons are any match for modem security forces invites
murderous confrontations that armed civilians will inevitably lose. Military action
today is a complex blend of intricate tactics, high-tech communication systems,
and powerful weaponry far beyond the wildest imagination of the Framers.'97
Paradoxically, it is the very complexity of modem warfare that may provide
the defense against tyranny that the Framers hoped firearms would produce. The
sophistication of today's equipment and soldiers ensures that armed amateurs
cannot prevail against a determined modem force; that same sophistication
militates against such a force becoming, especially in the United States, a tool of
despotism.
Modem militaries are no longer manned by the uneducated and blindly-
obedient dregs of society that populated the standing armies of the Framers' era.
Warfighting in the late twentieth century demands an independent-thinking, even
cosmopolitan force. For example, the proliferation of computer-supported
weapons and information systems requires increasingly educated and intelligent
soldiers capable, even at low levels, of making and communicating key decisions.
This leads one analyst to observe that "[a] smart, educated, coordinated military
team in a totalitarian regime is a true oxymoron."9
196. PORTER, supra note 18, at 202.
197. Technology continues to enhance the capabilities of the professional soldier. See
generally John G. Roos, The 21st Century Land Warrior, ARMED FORCES J., Feb. 1995, at
18.
198. Captain John W. Bodnar, USNR, The Military Technical Revolution, NAVAL WAR
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Nevertheless, the Framers' teaching remains a valid one: be vigilant. Though
it is doubtful that anyone in today's armed forces harbors any thoughts of
usurping power, ensuring firm civilian control of the military remains of vital
importance. But to do that effectively does not require civilians keeping and
bearing arms. Rather, it demands strengthening the institutions expected to
exercise civilian control and limiting the military's involvement in other than
traditional warfighting activities.'99
Removing the Second Amendment from the Constitution is neither necessary
nor desirable as some have suggested.2°° Instead, it should be subject to the
same balancing test that has been successfully used in reconciling conflicting
interests with respect to other amendments.20 Most of the focus of Second
Amendment debate relates to the wisdom of using firearms as a means of crime
control.2 2 It may be that a court pondering a gun control measure and consid-
ering the Framers' intent will conclude that given the de minimis combat
capability of armed civilians, the aim of resisting government tyranny is
outweighed by society's interest in resisting the tyranny imposed by the criminal
element of the armed citizenry. This methodology, while clearly displeasing to
Second Amendment absolutists, will also not satisfy gun control advocates
because the approach requires case-by-case analyses of each gun control measure.
Repealing the Second Amendment would not end constitutional arguments
over gun control.2"3 But more fundamentally, the Constitution has proven itself
to be a remarkably prescient and dynamic document-a balancing of competing
interests today may be upset by tomorrow's circumstances. The Second
Amendment, standing as it does for the quintessential American virtue of
individual responsibility, still serves as an important reminder of the Framers'
healthy suspicion of governmental power. In the final analysis, that may be its
most meaningful legacy.
COLLEGE REV., Summer 1993, at 20.
199. See generally Dunlap, supra note 87, at 390-92 (discussing recommendations to
improve civilian control of the military).
200. See Dan Peterson, Our Second Amendment Under Fire, AM. LEGION MAG., Jan.
1994, at 24 (discussing a House Joint Resolution proposing the repeal of the Second
Amendment).
201. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Cf Henry J. Abraham, First
Amendment Balancing, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT 300-01
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
202. See generally Dueling over Gun Control, WILSON Q., Summer 1994, at 125-26
(a survey of recent articles on gun control).
203. For example, a right to bear arms may reside in the Ninth or Tenth Amendment.
1995]
